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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rosa L. Greub entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance,
reserving her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. On appeal, she
asserts the district court erred by denying her motion when it determined her attempt to exit her
car with her purse did not delimit her consent to search her car and all containers inside. Contrary
to the district court’s decision, Ms. Greub’s conduct was a revocation of her consent to search
her purse. Because the police then unlawfully searched her purse without her consent, the district
court should have suppressed the evidence found inside. For this reason, Ms. Greub respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 10, 2016, between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 pm., Ms. Greub was parked in the back
corner  of  a  church  parking  lot  to  smoke  a  cigarette  before  work.  (R.,  pp.84-85;  Tr.,  p.35,
Ls.13-19.) Officer Christ of the Pocatello Police Department also drove into the back area of the
parking lot around this time to work on a crash report. (R., p.85; Tr., p.7, Ls.21-24, p.8, Ls.8-16.)
He was  in  his  patrol  car  and  in  uniform.  (R.,  p.85.)  He  saw Ms.  Greub’s  car  in  the  corner  and
testified that she looked startled that he had pulled into the parking lot. (R., p.85; Tr., p.11,
Ls.3-4.) Officer Christ decided to approach Ms. Greub because it was “weird.” (Tr., p.11,
Ls.7-11.) He parked his patrol car perpendicular to hers about twenty-three feet or fifteen yards
away. (R., p.85.) He then walked up to Ms. Greub’s car and asked her “what she was doing
there.”  (R.,  p.85;  Tr.,  p.13,  Ls.23-24.)  She  explained  that  she  was  smoking  a  cigarette  before
work because she could not smoke on the premises. (R., p.85; Tr., p.13, Ls.24-25, p.36,
Ls.13-19.) She did not have a cigarette in her hand, but she was wearing a uniform. (R., p.85;
2Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3, Ls.22-24.) (Officer Christ later found a pack of cigarettes in her car. (Tr., p.33,
Ls.9-12.)) Officer Christ testified that she appeared to be startled and extremely nervous.
(R., p.85; Tr., p.14, Ls.6-12.)
Officer Christ asked for Ms. Greub’s driver’s license. (R., p.85; Tr., p.15, Ls.5-6.) She
informed him that her license was suspended because she owed a reinstatement fee. (R., p.85;
Tr., p.15, Ls.8-12.) Ms. Greub gave him her identification card (“ID card”) instead, and Officer
Christ confirmed with her that that information was correct.1 (R., p.85; Tr., p.15, Ls.13-19, p.16,
Ls.9-12.) Officer Christ began questioning Ms. Greub about whether she had anything illegal in
her car: “alcohol, marijuana, any prescription pills.” (R., p.85; Tr., p.16, Ls.20-22.) She told him
no. (R., p.85; Tr., p.16, L.22, p.17, Ls.17-21.) He never asked her if she had any weapons.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.14-17.) During his questioning, Officer Christ testified that their conversation was
“extremely friendly.” (Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.2.) Officer Christ then asked Ms. Greub if he
“could look in her vehicle.” (R., p.85; Tr., p.17, L.23, p.29, Ls.23-25.) He testified that she
answered, “Sure.” (R., p.85; Tr., p.17, L.24, p.29, Ls.23-25.) He did not remember what he did
with her ID card, if he returned it to her or if he was still holding onto it. (R., p.85; Tr., p.17,
L.25 - p.18, L.6, p.28, Ls.12-14.)
Once Ms. Greub acquiesced to Officer Christ looking in her car, Officer Christ requested
a second patrol unit to assist with the search. (R., p.86; Tr., p.18, Ls.10-12.) He explained that
this was standard procedure for officer safety—one officer can stay with the individual while the
other searches the car. (R., p.86; Tr., p.18, Ls.13-16.) Officer Christ also directed Ms. Greub to
get out of her car. (R., pp.85-86; Tr., p.18, L.12, Ls.20-21.) She went to get her purse and exit the
1 Ms. Greub’s address apparently piqued Officer Christ’s interest because, assuming she was
coming from home, she would she would have driven past her work to get to the church parking
lot. (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-17, p.34, Ls.2-9.)
3car. (R., p.86; Tr., p.18, Ls.21-22, p.30, Ls.12-13.) Officer Christ, however, told her to leave her
purse inside. (R., p.86; Tr., p.18, Ls.22-23, p.30, Ls.14-17.) He testified that this command was
also for officer safety—even though he never observed any weapons, questioned Ms. Greub
about possessing one, or identified any reason to believe she was dangerous. (R., p.86; Tr., p.19,
Ls.5-10.) Ms. Greub complied and left her purse on the passenger seat. (R., p.86; Tr., p.19,
Ls.3-4.)
Despite Officer Christ’s request for a second patrol unit and his purported safety
concerns, he decided to start searching the car alone. (R., p.86; Tr., p.19, Ls.13-16.) He testified
that he did not want Ms. Greub to be late for work. (R., p.86; Tr., p.19, Ls.14-15.) Officer Christ
did  not  remember  if  he  patted  her  down  before  his  search,  but  he  believed  so.  (Tr.,  p.31,
Ls.10-13.) She was not handcuffed. (See Tr., p.24, Ls.8-10.) Officer Christ told her to stand in
front of his patrol car and then began his search. (R., p.86; Tr., p.19, Ls.12-13.) He found an
opened, but capped, bottle of whiskey in a brown paper bag by the center console with “some of
the contents” gone. (R., p.86; Tr., p.20, Ls.2-22, p.25, Ls.11-13.) After this, Officer Christ talked
to Ms. Greub about the bottle he had just found while he kept waiting for the second patrol unit.
(R., p.86; Tr., p.21, Ls.5-9, p.22, Ls.16-22.) Officer Christ testified that Ms. Greub admitted that
she had “one swig” from the bottle. (Tr., p.20, Ls.23-24.) He never testified that he smelled any
alcohol on her or observed any signs of impairment.
The second patrol unit still had not arrived, so Officer Christ decided to continue
searching Ms. Greub’s car. (R., p.86; Tr., p.23, Ls.7-11.) He unzipped her purse and found a
crystallized substance, which he recognized as methamphetamine, in a clear baggie inside.
(R., p.86; Tr., p.23, L.12 - p.24, L.1.) Officer Christ subsequently arrested Ms. Greub for
possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.86; Tr., p.24, Ls.2-5.) As he was taking her to his patrol
4car, the second patrol unit arrived. (R., p.86; Tr., p.24, Ls.21-24.) Officer Christ searched
Ms. Greub’s purse again and found a pipe. (R., p.86; Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.5.) He also
continued his search of her vehicle. (Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.2.) He did not testify to finding any
other contraband in her car.
The  State  filed  a  Complaint  -  Criminal  alleging  Ms.  Greub  committed  the  crime  of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).
(R., pp.7-8.) She waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound her over to district
court. (R., pp.45, 47.) The State filed an Information charging Ms. Greub with possession of a
controlled substance. (R., pp.49-50.)
Ms. Greub moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of her purse.
(R., pp.51-52.) The district court held a hearing on her motion in which Officer Christ and
Ms. Greub testified. (See generally Tr.,2 p.5, L.1 - p.46, L.1.) The district court took the matter
under advisement, and the parties filed post-hearing briefs. Among other arguments, Ms. Greub
argued Officer Christ’s order to leave her purse in the car was unjustified because he had no
officer safety concerns. (R., pp.66-67.) She further asserted, if she did initially consent to a
search of her car and all containers inside, her attempt to take her purse with her was a
revocation of her consent to search her purse. (R., pp.67-68.) The State filed a brief in
opposition. (R., pp.70-83.)
2 There is one transcript on appeal. The first fifty-five pages contain the motion to suppress and
sentencing hearings. (See Tr., p.4.) Starting on page fifty-six, a separate document contains the
entry of plea hearing. (See Tr., pp.56-57.) These pages are numbered one through six, instead of
continuing with the pagination from the motion to suppress and sentencing hearings. Citations to
the entry of plea hearing will refer to both the page number corresponding with the entire
transcript (one through fifty-nine) as well as the individual page number (one through six).
5The district court denied Ms. Greub’s motion. (R., pp.84-99.) The district court found
Ms. Greub’s argument on officer safety concerns was without merit because consent, not a
Terry3 frisk for weapons, provided a lawful basis for the warrantless search. (R., p.91.) The
district court also determined Ms. Greub voluntarily consented to a search of her car and purse.
(R., pp.91-92, 96-98.) Finally, the district court reasoned Ms. Greub did not revoke her consent
to search her purse. (R., pp.92-95.)
Ms. Greub pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.111, 120-21;
Tr., p.58 (p.4, L.8 - p.6, L.9).) She reserved her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her
motion to suppress. (Tr., p.58 (p.1, Ls.12-13), p.59 (p.5, Ls.14-18), see also Tr., p.50, Ls.2-8.)
The district court withheld judgment and placed Ms. Greub on probation for four years.
(Tr., p.51, Ls.1-2; R., pp.136-38.) Ms. Greub timely appealed from the district court’s minute
entry and judgment of conviction. (R., pp.142-44.)
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Greub’s motion to suppress?
7ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Greub’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
 Ms. Greub raises one issue on appeal with respect to the district court’s denial of her
motion to suppress. She contends the district court erred because she revoked or delimited her
consent to search her car and all containers inside when she exited the car with her purse. As
such, Officer Christ’s search of her purse was unlawful. Due to the unlawful search, the district
court should have granted her motion.
B. Standard of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to
suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). “The Court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C. The District Court Should Have Suppressed The Evidence From Ms. Greub’s Purse
Because Officer Christ Did Not Have Her Consent To Search It
“The  Fourth  Amendment  of  the  United  States  Constitution  protects  citizens  from
unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). “A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause, is
8presumptively unreasonable.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796. In general, the State bears the burden to
show the warrantless search falls within a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).
Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97
(Ct. App. 2006). A “general, unlimited” consent to search a vehicle includes consent to search all
containers therein. State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11, 13 (2000); see also Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248 (1991). “It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the  consent  was  voluntary  rather  than  the  result  of  duress  or  coercion,  direct  or  implied.”
Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97. This has also been described as “a heavy burden to prove that the
consent was given freely and voluntarily.” State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94 (Ct. App. 1984)
(citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968)). Here, it is undisputed that
Officer Christ did not have a warrant to search Ms. Greub’s car. Thus, the State bears the burden
to justify Officer Christ’s warrantless search of her purse pursuant to the consent exception.
Even if an individual voluntarily consents to a search, that consent may be revoked.
State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (2004); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696 (1999). After an
individual has revoked consent, a subsequent search by law enforcement is no longer pursuant to
the initially voluntary consent. Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154; see also Staatz, 132 Idaho at 696. The
standard for measuring a revocation of consent “is that of objective reasonableness, ‘what would
the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
subject.’” Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251); see also Staatz,
132 Idaho at 696. In addition, an individual “may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of
the search to which he consents.” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252.
9In this case, Ms. Greub revoked or delimited her consent to search by taking her purse
with her when she began to exit the car. A “typical reasonable person” would have understood
from Ms. Greub’s behavior that she intended to revoke or delimit her consent with respect to the
purse. Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). “Purses are special
containers. They are repositories of especially personal items that people generally like to keep
with them at all times.” State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 183 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring)). Considering a purse’s “special”
status, it is objectively reasonable that an individual removing her purse from a car after
consenting to a search of the car intends to exclude her purse from the search and limit the search
to the remaining items in the car. Officer Christ should have “understood by the exchange” that
Ms. Greub was delimiting or revoking her consent to search her purse. Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154
(quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). Therefore, the district court erred by ruling Ms. Greub
consented to its search.
Further, this Court’s decisions in Newsom, Holland, and Watts are instructive on an
individual’s ability to limit the police’s search of containers inside a vehicle. First, in State v.
Newsom, 132 Idaho 698 (1998), the police asked a passenger to get out of a car after the police
had arrested the driver and intended to search the car incident to the driver’s arrest. Id. at 698-99.
The passenger had her purse on her lap. Id. at 698, 700. She began to exit the car with her purse,
but the police ordered her to leave it in the car. Id. at 699, 700. She complied. Id. at 699, 700.
The police then searched the car, including the passenger’s purse. Id. at 699. This Court reasoned
“the passenger did not leave her purse in the vehicle voluntarily” because she was following a
police officer’s order. Id at 700. Thus, this Court held the police unlawfully searched the
passenger’s purse and, as a result, the evidence found in the purse should be suppressed. Id.
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Second, in State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (2000), similar to Newsom, the police asked
the passenger to exit a car before the police searched it incident to the driver’s arrest.4 Id. at 160,
163. But, unlike the passenger in Newsom, the Holland passenger “voluntarily left her purse
behind.” Holland, 135 Idaho at 163. The police did not order the passenger to leave her purse in
the car or otherwise place her purse in the car. Id. In distinguishing Holland from Newsom, this
Court clarified:
The holding [in Newsom]  does  not  stand  for  the  proposition  that  a  passenger’s
belongings may never be search. Instead, Newsom stands for the proposition that
the police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it within the
passenger compartment of a car or by ordering someone else to place it there for
them.
Holland, 135 Idaho at 163. Since the Holland passenger just left her purse in the car, this Court
held, “The purse was, therefore, a container within the passenger compartment of the vehicle and
subject to a search incident” to the driver’s arrest. Id.
Finally, in State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230 (2005), this Court reaffirmed the distinguishing
principle from Holland and Newsom. Like Newsom and Holland, the police had arrested the
driver and then asked the passenger to exit the car. Id. at 231, 235. The passenger left her purse
in the car, and the police searched it. Id. at 231, 235. On appeal, the Watts passenger challenged
the district court’s factual finding that she voluntarily left her purse in the car. Id. at 234-35. This
Court upheld the district court’s finding because there was no evidence the passenger “was
required to leave” her purse in the car. Id. at 235. Further, this Court highlighted that the traffic
stop video showed the passenger carrying a large plastic container from the car, which indicated
the passenger was free to remove that item and likely her purse as well. Id. Therefore, this Court
held the passenger was not entitled to the Newsom exception because no evidence showed the
4 The police also intended to impound the car. Holland, 135 Idaho at 160.
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police ordered her the leave her purse in the car. Id. This Court also declined to overrule
Holland. Id. at 234.
Although Newsom, Holland, and Watts are  search  incident  to  arrest  cases,  the  same
principle to determine whether the police lawfully searched a container in a car applies with
equal force here. The takeaway from Newsom, Holland, and Watts is that the police “cannot
create a right to search” by thwarting an individual’s attempt to restrict the scope of the police’s
search. Holland, 135 Idaho at 163. Whether the warrantless search occurs through the search
incident to arrest exception or the consent exception is a distinction without a difference. Under
both exceptions, the police are lawfully permitted to search a car and the containers inside.5 In
both situations, the individual with the privacy interest in the item to be searched has the ability
to limit the search—the passenger may take her purse (or his wallet, presumably) from the car;
the consenting individual may revoke or delimit the scope of her consent. If the police, then,
engage in behavior that disregards or contravenes the individual’s intent—such as ordering the
individual to leave to the item in the car or otherwise seizing the item—the search of that item is
unlawful.
Here, Ms. Greub’s conduct fits squarely in line with that of the passenger in Newsom. As
in Newsom,  Ms.  Greub  went  to  exit  the  car  with  her  purse,  which  was  an  attempt  to  restrict
Officer  Christ’s  search  of  it.  Upon  observing  this,  Officer  Christ  should  not  have  ordered
Ms. Greub to leave her purse in the car. He should have understood this as a revocation or
limitation of her consent. Unlike the passengers in Holland or Watts, Ms. Greub did not
5 For the search of a car incident to arrest, the police can search the entire car and its containers
if:   (1)  the  arrestee  is  within  reaching  distance  of  the  passenger  compartment;  or  (2)  it  is
reasonable to believe evidence of the offense of arrest will be found in the car. State v. Frederick,
149 Idaho 509, 515 (2010).
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voluntarily leave her purse behind. Ms. Greub left her purse behind only after Officer Christ
commanded her to do so. Thus, her compliance with the officer’s command does not negate her
attempt at revocation. See Newsom, 132 Idaho at 699 (holding the defendant did not leave her
purse in the car voluntarily even though she had followed the police’s order). Therefore, in light
of Newsom and its progeny, and the “objectively reasonable” standard for revocation, the district
court erred by determining Ms. Greub consented to the search of her purse. She did not, and
Officer Christ’s search of her purse was unlawful. The district court should have suppressed all
evidence obtained from the police’s warrantless search of her purse. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional police conduct
subject to exclusion); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2008) (same).
CONCLUSION
Ms. Greub respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
her motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s minute entry and judgment of conviction, and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of May, 2017.
/s/
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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